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 Abstract 
 
Voluntary forest set-asides have increased in Sweden since 1996 when they were first 
introduced. The theory of voluntary agreements states that they should be cost minimizing 
and flexible. The principle with voluntary forest set-asides is that the forest owners in a 
voluntary way should set forest with a high biological value aside from production. The 
voluntary forest set aside should be a connecting area of productive forest land (0.5 ha) where 
no actions that can hurt the biodiversity are allowed. In Sweden the environmental goal, 
Sustainable Forests, states that until 2010, 730 000 ha forest should be set aside below the 
mountain border.  
 
Profit maximising forest owners set aside forest where the marginal benefits are equal to the 
marginal cost. An estimated marginal cost curve for Sweden, based on the average assessed 
value/ha forest as the opportunity cost, shows the supply of set-asides. Two different supply 
curves are estimated; the first is based on certificated forest and the second are adjusted with 
the results concerning voluntary forest set-asides from the Forest Agency. The differences 
between these two curves are considerable, which could have an effect if the government 
intends to introduce a subsidy. For both curves the lower part show a relative low increase of 
marginal cost but as hectares of voluntary set-asides increase the marginal cost rises faster. 
The reason is that in Sweden large amount of forest can be set aside to a low opportunity cost 
in the north but in the south the opportunity cost rises for the set-asides and less hectares are 
set aside. The flexibility from forest set-asides can vary for forest companies and small forest 
owners. In Sweden the small forest owners have the smallest share of forest set-asides which 
may be caused by their lower benefits as compared to the forest companies.  
 
The statistical estimates are based on too few investigations of the voluntary forest set-asides 
in Sweden to give a proper picture about their cost. The reason is that no investigations have 
estimated how much forest that is set aside in each county. A robust conclusion is, however, 
that the area of voluntary set-asides depends on the location in Sweden they are made. There 
is also a difference in relative area of forest set aside by small and large forest owners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key terms: forest set-asides, voluntary agreements, marginal cost curve 
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Sammanfattning  
 
Frivilliga överenskommelser som politiskt instrument ökar inom miljörelaterade områden. De 
ses som flexibla och kostnadsminimerande. 1996 bildades begreppet frivilliga avsättningar. 
Tanken är att skogsägarna på en frivillig väg ska avsätta skog med högre biologiska värden 
från produktionen. Definitionen av en frivillig avsättning är ett område på 0.5 ha 
sammanhängande produktiv skogsmark inom vilket åtgärder som kan skada den biologiska 
mångfalden inte får utföras. I och med miljömålet levande skogar har regeringen fastställt ett 
mål för frivilliga avsättningar. Till år 2010 bör ca 730 000 ha skog vara avsatt nedanför 
fjällgränsen.  
 
En vinstmaximerande skogsägare avsätter skog där marginalnyttan från avsättningen är lika 
stor som marginalkostnaden från avsättningen.  För Sverige visar en skattad 
marginalkostnadskurva baserad på taxeringsvärdet per hektar som alternativkostnad hur 
utbudet av frivilliga avsättningar kan se ut. Två olika utbudskurvor skattas, en baserad på 
certifierad skog och den andra när justeringar efter resultat från Skogstyrelsen gjorts. Dessa 
båda kurvor visar på stora skillnader, vilket kan ha en effekt om Sveriges regering skulle vilja 
införa en subvention för att öka de frivilliga avsättningarna. Gemensamt för båda är att 
marginalkostnaden inte ökar i så hög trakt den första delen av kurvan för att därefter öka i en 
högre takt. Detta beror främst på att större areal i norra Sverige kan tas undan från 
produktionen till en lägre alternativkostnad men ju längre söderut i Sverige avsättningarna 
görs desto högre blir alternativkostnaden och färre hektar avsätts. Flexibiliteten inom frivilliga 
överenskommelser kan variera mellan större skogsbolag och mindre skogsägare. I Sverige är 
det småskogsägarna som avsätter procentuellt minst skog vilket kan bero på att deras 
marginalnytta från avsättningarna inte överstiger marginalkostnaden.  
 
De statistiska skattningarna är baserade på för få undersökningar om frivilliga avsättningar för 
att kunna ge en bild av dess kostnad. Detta beror på att det inte finns undersökningar som 
visar hur mycket areal som avsätts i varje län i Sverige. Men för mängden hektar som avsätts 
har det betydelse var i Sverige avsättningarna görs och det har även betydelse vilken typ av 
skogsägare, småskogsägare eller bolag, det handlar om.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key terms: frivilliga skogsavsättnigar, frivilliga överenskommelser, marginalkostnadskurva 
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Abbreviatons  
 
FSC = Forest Stewardship Council 
 
PEFC = Pan European Forest Certification Scheme 
 
VA = voluntary agreements 
 
VFSs = voluntary forest set-asides 
 
VPA = voluntary public agreement 
 
 
 
 
  viii 
 
 
 Table of Contents 
 
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 PROBLEM BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 AIM ................................................................................................................................................................ 2 
1.3 METHOD ........................................................................................................................................................ 2 
1.4 LIMITATIONS.................................................................................................................................................. 3 
1.4 DISPOSITION................................................................................................................................................... 3 
2 MODEL FOR VFSS .......................................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 FOREST COMPANIES AND PRIVATE OWNERS ................................................................................................... 3 
2.2 THE SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT ................................................................................................................... 6 
2.3 HOW TO MAKE AND EVALUATE A VA ............................................................................................................ 9 
3 ESTIMATIONS BASED ON FSC AND THE FOREST AGENCY............................................................ 10 
3.1 ESTIMATION OF VFS SUPPLY CURVE............................................................................................................ 10 
3.2 SUBSIDY POLICY FOR VFSS.......................................................................................................................... 17 
3.3 VFSS MADE BY DIFFERENT FOREST OWNERS................................................................................................ 19 
4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................... 21 
5 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................ 24 
BOOKS ............................................................................................................................................................... 24 
ARTICLES........................................................................................................................................................... 24 
REPORTS ............................................................................................................................................................ 25 
INTERNET........................................................................................................................................................... 25 
PERSONAL MESSAGES ........................................................................................................................................ 27 
6. APPENDIX...................................................................................................................................................... 28 
APPENDIX 1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 28 
APPENDIX 2 ....................................................................................................................................................... 29 
APPENDIX 3 ....................................................................................................................................................... 31 
APPENDIX 4 ....................................................................................................................................................... 32 
APPENDIX 5 ....................................................................................................................................................... 34 
APPENDIX 6 ....................................................................................................................................................... 36 
 
 
  1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem background 
 
Voluntary Agreements (VAs) are becoming an attractive option within environmental policy. 
The main reason is that they are seen as less costly than regulation since they can reach the 
environment goal in a more flexible and cost minimizing way (Segerson & Li, 2000). In 
Sweden a mean to protect forest is voluntary forest set-asides (VFSs). The definition of 
voluntary forest set-asides is:  
 
“0.5 ha voluntary set aside connected productive forest land, within which forestry and other 
measures that can damage the biodiversity are not allowed” 
(Own translation, Skogsstyrelsen, p 3, December 2001.) 
 
In Sweden most of the forest land, 51 %, has private owners, the rest is divided between forest 
companies, 24 %, the state, 18 %, other private owners, 6 % and other public owners, 1 % 
(skogstyrelsen 2006). Many of the private owners are organised in the forest associations 
Södra, Mellanskog, Norra skogsägarna or Norrskog (www, Lantbrukarnas riksförbund1, 
2006).   
 
An important part of the new forest policy, introduced 1993, was to regard biodiversity as the 
base for well functioning and stabile ecosystems. The change in the forest policy was needed 
because in the earlier version from 1979 the environmental questions were not given proper 
weight. It was also important for the new forest policy to work together with the overall 
policies and contribute to deregulation and increased competition in Sweden. The main idea 
underlying the forest policy is to increase the forest owners' ambitions to do more than what is 
legislative through voluntary actions by providing consultation and education. The state has 
the main responsibility to see to that counselling is available for the forest owners, who need 
information (Skogsstyrelsen, November, 2001). 
The concept of voluntary forest set-asides (VFSs) was introduced 1996 when the Swedish 
Forest Agency evaluated some parts of the new forest policy. The word voluntary means that 
the forest owner himself makes the decision to put forest aside from production. The decision 
is therefore not the result of what the authorities say or some kind of formal agreement, 
further the forest owner does not receive any financial compensation for the VFSs 
(Skogsstyrelsen, December, 2001).   
 
The VFSs are supposed to be seen as a complement to the protections of forest financed by 
the government. The forest owner has to know the occurrence of biotopes on his land, and 
therefore new ways to obtain information are required. Today, the green forest plans which 
consist of consulting and information play an important role for voluntary forest set-asides 
(Skogstyrelsen, 2001). All counselling organizations like the Forest Agency, forest 
associations and counselling firms suggest where and how much forest the owner should set 
aside from production. The amount varies, but approximately 3 % - 5 % of the total forest 
land is suggested to be set aside (Skogstyrelsen October 2001). 
The owner can also get his forest certificated through one of the two certifications systems. 
FSC, Forest Stewardship Council, is an international independent organization that consists of 
environmental organizations, forest producers, companies buying forest etc. For each country 
participating in FSC national rules are decided. One requirement to get certificated through 
FSC in Sweden a minimum of 5 % VFSs. Today 45 % of the Swedish forest is FSC-
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certificated, this includes all the big forest companies (www, Svenska 
naturskyddsföreningen1, 2006). The second, and more industry oriented certification system is 
the PEFC, Pan European Forest Certification Scheme which was initiated by the forest 
associations. The Swedish PEFC was approved by the international PEFC council in 2000. In 
Sweden the PEFC's main participant is SÄF (Swedish association of forest owners) divided in 
Norra, Södra and Mellan. No environmental organization has chosen to support the Swedish 
PEFC (www, pefc1, 2006). All four forest associations organised under LRF today 
recommend 5 % VFSs under PEFC (www, Norra Skogsägarna1, Mellanskog1, Södra1, 
Skogsägarna Norrskog1, 2006).  
  
”Sustainable forests: The natural productive capacity of forests and forest land must be 
protected and biological diversity and culture heritage and recreational assets preserved” 
(prop. 1997/98:145, p 6, English summary) 
 
The Swedish parliament accepted 15 environmental objectives in April 1999 and Sustainable 
Forests is one of these. The aim is to manage the forests in a sustainable way. The intention is 
that the objectives should be reached until 2020 so that the next generation also can profit 
from the forests (www, Sveriges Miljömål1, 2006). The reasons for this objective were the 
fact that 95 % of the productive forest land was used for forestry and this was seen as a threat 
against valuable biotopes (prop. 1997/ 98: 145). To reach the part objective, 730 000 ha forest 
should be set aside below the mountain border in a voluntarily way until 2010 (www, 
Sveriges Miljömål2, 2006).  
 
 
1.2 Aim  
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the potential of VFSs from a theoretical perspective, and to 
estimate a supply curve, i.e. a marginal cost curve for VFSs in Sweden. The results are 
compared with the results from the Forest Agency concerning VFSs. Which conclusions can 
be made from these results? How are the VFSs working with respect to flexibility and cost 
minimization, and where in Sweden it is likely that VFSs can be made? What can be said 
about the incentives for VFSs and is there a difference between the amounts of forest set aside 
by different owners?  
 
 
1.3 Method 
 
This thesis applies micro economic analysis for evaluating the VFSs in Sweden in a 
theoretical and empirical way. The empirical model will be based on data from the FSC since 
they have estimated the forest area that is certificated in each county. From this data an 
estimation of the marginal cost curve of VFSs in Sweden will be made. By accumulating the 
hectare of VFSs at different assessed values/ ha from two years a regression analysis is then 
made. This analysis provides an estimated curve that is used as base for the marginal cost 
curve. The estimated curve will then finally be compared with the data presented by the 
Forest Agency.  
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1.4 Limitations  
 
The forest is a wide subject with many aspects, but in this thesis the focus will be on VFSs in 
Sweden based on the results published by the Forest Agency. Aspects like how forestry in 
Sweden is managed, the wood market, forest owners’ relationship with their forest, and how 
the forest is inherited will not be addressed. Recently in Sweden storms have had and have a 
great impact on forest in the south. Their affect on the VFSs will not be discussed in this 
thesis. No investigations have been made for the entire Sweden concerning the biological 
value of the VFSs and therefore this thesis will not estimate which kind of forest that is set-
aside. The assessed value used in this thesis is a general value for each county, and does not 
show the assessed value for the VFSs, since there is no knowledge of the exact location of 
these within each county. 
 
 
1.4 Disposition 
 
In the second chapter a theoretical analysis will be presented that compares the VFSs with the 
economic theory of voluntary agreements. This analysis will be the basis for chapter three 
where the empirical results, the estimated marginal cost curve and the results from the Forest 
Agency are presented. In the fourth chapter a summary and a discussion based on the previous 
chapters will be done. 
 
 
2 Model for VFSs 
 
Voluntary agreements can usually take one of the three following forms. The first is a 
unilateral action which means that a polluter or a group of polluters take the incentive 
themselves to abate. The government is not involved directly but can encourage and assess 
these agreements. The second form of voluntary agreement is bilateral agreements between a 
regulatory agency and a polluter which is based on negotiation, and the third form is a 
voluntary program where the regulator decides the obligations (Alberini & Segerson, 2002). 
One can define a voluntary forest set-aside (VFSs) as unilateral initiatives which are 
introduced by the forest companies and associations to protect forest. For example, the 
government was not allowed to be part of the negotiations when the standards for FSC in 
Sweden concerning among other things the minimum requirement of VFSs were set. Instead 
the main participants were the industry and some environmental groups, like WWF Sweden 
and SNF (Boström, 2002). The government in Sweden encourages the voluntary actions by 
designing an environmental goal, Sustainable Forests, which includes an objective for VFSs 
(www, Sveriges Miljömål2, 2006).  
 
 
2.1 Forest companies and private owners 
 
The voluntary agreement (VA) is an attractive policy instrument compared to regulation if it 
leads to potential cost savings due to more flexibility. With a VA the polluters can choose 
which strategy to use to reach an environmental target. The firm will not participate unless his 
pay off is at least as high as it would have been without participating. There must be some 
gains from the VA or at least no net loss. A mandatory instrument like a tax or regulation can 
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lead to a higher cost for the firms and they can therefore be worse off than if a VA would 
have been used (Alberini & Segerson, 2002).  
 
One forest owner, i, has both marginal benefits (MBi) and marginal cost (MCi) from the VFSs. 
Possible benefits will be discussed in the following part of this section. Possible cost can be 
the loss in profit from non-harvested forest or need to seek information about VFSs. It is 
assumed that the MCi increase and the MBi decrease with the area of VFSs. The optimal 
choice, VFSs* is where MCi = MBi. If the VFSs are below VFSs* the MBi is greater than the 
MCi and the forest owner can increase his benefits more than his cost by setting more forest 
aside. If the VFSs are higher then VFSs* the forest owner can reduce his cost by more than he 
can increase his benefits. He can therefore increase his net benefits by setting less forest aside. 
The net benefits represent the area below the MBi and over MCi up to the VFSs* (Perman et 
al, 2003) See figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal voluntary forest set-asides for one forest firm  
(Source: own adaptation of Perman et al, p 120, 2003) 
 
 
One benefit that can come from VAs is environmental stewardship, which means that the 
participation in a VA is motivated by personal satisfaction or utility gains from contributing to 
something that protects the environment. This is more common when the pollution stems 
from individual behaviour and not from organization behaviour (Alberini & Segerson, 2002). 
With VFSs it is likely that the small forest owner can feel this personal satisfaction from 
putting forest aside from production. Usually the forest is inherited and the owner can feel an 
increase in utility when preserving forest for the next generation. It is not likely that the larger 
forest companies see the personal satisfaction as an incentive for VFSs. The forest industry 
can have benefits from the good-will that comes from making VFSs. Through the VFSs they 
might be able to influence the government and signal themselves as ”good” (ibid). Another 
strong incentive for the industry to join the VA is that they can avoid negative publicity by 
doing something ”good” ( Karamanos, 2002). 
 
There are also market-based incentives, when consumers with a ”green” preference can 
influence the market and increase the demand for more environmental friendly products 
(Alberini & Segerson, 2002). This leads to shifts of the demand and supply curves which 
make the environmental activity more profitable. Consumers have reached an income level at 
which they are willing to pay for the environmentally friendly products. The basic notion of 
”greener” production is that it gives the firms an opportunity to differentiate their products 
SEK 
VFSs VFSs* 
MCi 
MBi 
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which enables them to set a higher price (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004). For the forest owners it is 
mainly through FSC and PEFC that they can obtain the certificate that says that their product 
is ”greener” than conventional managed forest. There has also been pressure on the wood 
market, important companies like IKEA and other furniture companies only buy certificated 
wood (Boström, 2002). Forest associations also have different incentives like bonus to forest 
owners who get certificated and some also offer a different price for certificated wood (www, 
Skogsägarna Norrskog2, Norra Skogsagarna1, Mellanskog1, Södra2, 2006). 
The government can create incentives for the firms to join the VA if the marked-based 
incentives are not strong enough. Common positive incitements are financial like cost-sharing 
or subsidies (Alberini & Segerson, 2002). The government should set the subsidy (µ*) to a 
level where the desirable amount of environmental improvement, here ha of VFSs (VFSs*) is 
done, see figure 2. The subsidy would then represent the marginal benefit for the forest owner 
at VFSs*. The subsidy would give an incentive to set forest aside and it would be profitable 
for the forest owner to set forest aside as long as his marginal cost is lower than the subsidy 
obtained per ha of VFSs. The optimal outcome is when the subsidy is equal to the marginal 
cost from VFSs (Perman et al, 2003). A government investigation suggests that a financial 
compensation should be given to the forest owners who make VFSs (SOU 2006:81). Today 
the forest owners do not get any compensation from the government for the VFSs they make. 
A positive incitement from the Swedish government that is used today is the counselling and 
information about VFSs that they provide through the Forest Agency (Skogsstyrelsen, 
November, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The efficient level of VFSs under a subsidy 
(Source: own adaptation of Perman et al, p 218, 2003) 
 
 
The government can also provide negative inducements to make the VA work. The most 
common is a threat to impose a regulation like a tax. Then the VA could be a way for the firm 
to pre-empt future legislation (Alberini & Segerson, 2002). For this incentive to be effective it 
must be credible, in other words the regulator must be willing to implement the policy if the 
VA is not set in place. The threat is more credible if there is an existing regulation and the VA 
can lead to an exception from it. The VA should therefore be more successful if it is 
supported by an underlying regulation framework (Alberini & Segerson, 2002). There was no 
underlying regulation for the VFSs in the middle of the 90ths when the concept was 
SEK/ha 
 
µ* 
Ha VFSs VFSs* 
Marginal benefit 
Marginal cost 
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introduced. Instead, with the new forest policy, deregulation was promoted (Skogsstyrelsen, 
November, 2001). It could have been the case that there was a threat of future regulations in 
the middle of the 90ths when the conditions for the certification system, FSC was negotiated. 
Anna Lind, then the environmental minister of Sweden, did make a statement that if the forest 
industry and the environmental groups could not reach an agreement over the terms of 
certification the government would take over the negotiations. The conditions for the 
agreement were then negotiated without the government. Representatives from the different 
organisations present during these negotiations state that the threat had little or no effect 
(Boström, 2002). 
 
Segerson and Li 1999, have adopted a model that shows firms' incentives to enter a VA when 
there are no incentives from the government, and also when they threat to impose a 
mandatory tax or abatement level. This model shows that the firm, here the forest owner, will 
have incentives to choose voluntary actions, VFSs, even in the absence of a mandatory threat. 
The forest owner will make VFSs if the increased profits from selling certificated wood or 
benefits from e.g. environmental stewardship exceed the cost of implementing VFSs. The 
alternative, when it is certain that a mandatory regulation will be implemented, the forest 
owner will always prefer to make VFSs, in order to gain flexibility. Any positive legislation 
threat is enough to initiate a VA and the level of abatement is related directly to the 
magnitude of the legislation. With a weak threat the level will be low and with a strong threat 
the abatement level will be higher (Segerson & Li, 1999).  
 
There can be a free-rider incentive associated with the VA (Albertini & Segerson, 2002). This 
is more common when the regulator sets an industry target for the VA and threat to introduce 
a tax if the target is not reached. Then, if the tax can be avoided without all firms in the 
industry participating, some firms might choose not to join. They can then enjoy the benefit of 
not having a tax that comes from the participation in the VA by other firms. These firms hope 
that what the others are doing will be enough to prevent the new regulation. Still the VA can 
be successful as an industry wide program with a fixed target, because if the VA is not met all 
firms are worse off if the regulation gets imposed. Therefore it exists an incentive for firms to 
join as long as the cost of participation is the same or not higher than the cost that would have 
come with the regulation (ibid).The incentive to free-ride goes away if the voluntary 
agreement only gets implemented if all join. This would mean that if one firm free-ride the 
VA will collapse (Segerson and Miceli, 1999). 
 
In Sweden the government has the environmental objective, Sustainable Forest, where it is 
said how much VFSs they want for Sweden until 2020 (www, Sveriges Miljömål2, 2006). 
This could perhaps induce forest companies and forest owners to free-ride, if some forest 
owners can benefit from a better public image for the industry as whole when others do a lot 
of VFSs. Smaller forest owners might feel that they do not have to do anything since the 
larger forest companies make VFSs and they can not contribute with that much. When some 
small forest owners in Sweden were asked about VFSs a few thought it was unfair that they 
had to do any (Jansson, 2005). The Forest Agency should focus on the big forest companies 
who in their eyes got away to easy (ibid).   
 
 
2.2 The society and government 
 
One of the strongest social motivations for VAs is that they can reduce the cost of meeting 
environmental standards through flexibility and incentives for innovations. With a VA the 
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firms are free to choose in which way they want to reach the environmental target. The firms 
can then choose a more cost minimizing way since they are able to design their own strategy. 
These cost savings can be seen as social benefits since they can lead to resources being freed 
up, which then can be used for the production of other goods (Segerson & Li 1999).  
Besides the cost-efficiency, the European Commission recognised two other benefits from 
VAs. The first is increased pro-active approach to environmental improvements from the 
industry. With more traditional regulation instruments the firms involved are often consulted 
late in the process. A result from this could be that they take a more defensive position instead 
of a more pro-active. An open dialogue between the regulator and the industry might lessen 
the defensive response. A negotiation process can lead to a common understanding of the 
environmental problems. The second benefit is a faster achievement of objectives especially 
when the agreement involves a small number of companies. An example from the EU is that 
from a proposal to an environmental directive it takes about two years and then another two 
years until the directive gets adapted in the member states. This process would not be 
necessary if a VA was to be used (European Commission, 1996).  
 
For the government possible incentives for VAs are that they can reduce the need for 
regulation and other policy instruments if the industry itself makes the necessary 
environmental improvements. VAs can create awareness and also address issues about which 
there are not enough knowledge and no will to introduce any regulation exists (Brink, 2002).  
The flexibility from VFSs is that the forest owner can choose himself how much VFSs he 
wants and which forest he wants to take away from production. He can also choose to join a 
certification system which requires a minimum share of VFSs (Skogsstyrelsen, November, 
2001). The pro-active approach would mean that the forest industry and associations 
themselves were a part of introducing the concept of VFSs. In the Swedish FSC negotiations 
the government was not involved. Instead the industry and some environmental groups 
negotiated (Boström, 2002). This might have increased the awareness about the importance of 
the VFSs.   
 
A policy instrument can have a variety of transaction costs connected to it. These can be costs 
for searching information, monitoring and revising the instrument (Perman et al, 2003). In 
figure 3, the benefits and costs for the society from forest set-asides are shown. The marginal 
gross benefits from forest set-asides are represented by MV, this should represent the benefits 
from forest set-asides. The real cost of forest set-asides is represented by Σi MCi , for example 
the cost of reduction in production when more forest is set aside. If these were the only costs 
from forest set-asides the optimal outcome would be FSs*. To compare different regulation 
instruments the transaction cost, TRC, that comes from each instrument should be included 
(Perman et al, 2003). It is often argued that the VAs mean less transaction costs than 
regulation instruments. One reason is that VAs might cause fewer conflicts between the 
industry and government and that there are less legal procedures involved (Segerson & 
Miceli, 1998). There are some transaction costs that come with VAs, one example is the need 
for information and monitoring. In the figure the total cost of a VFSs is Σi MCi + TRCV and 
the optimal outcome under VFSs is VFSs*. Possible transaction costs under VFSs are the 
work that the Forest Agency makes to evaluate the VFSs or the cost of the forest owners to 
seek information about key biotopes. The total cost when using a mandatory instrument like a 
tax is Σi MCi +TRCM and the optimal outcome when using a tax is MVFs*. It is clear that the 
VFSs* is preferred over the MFSs* when the transaction cost are lower under this option. This 
is a simple model where the purpose is to create an illustrative picture. Any choice of policy 
instrument should be studied from case to case and usually it is difficult to see before the 
instrument is used the transaction costs associated with it (Perman et al, 2003).  
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Figure 3: Optimal forest set-asides under regulation and voluntary approach  
(Source: own adaptation of Perman et al, p 262, 2003) 
 
 
For the government it is interesting to know the summation of the marginal cost from all 
forest owners since this would represent the supply curve of VFSs in Sweden. This supply 
curve can then be used for estimation of the effective level of a subsidy or a tax (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2001). In an investigation made by the government some suggestions about how to 
improve the VFSs are made (SOU 2006:81 ). In order to come to terms with some problems 
like monitoring and assuring the duration of the VFSs, a more formal agreement could be 
used. This would be an agreement between the government and the forest owners, a so called 
public voluntary agreement, PVA. It is also suggested that this agreement could include some 
financial compensation to the forest owners who join (ibid).  
 
Lyon and Maxwell (2002) present a model that examines how firms react when facing a 
regulation, here a tax. They also estimate how self-regulation is affected when the government 
offers a PVA with subsidies to the firms that join. Lyon and Maxwell see two possible 
incentives for unilateral voluntary actions here VFSs. First, if the unilateral voluntary actions 
do not pre-empt the tax they might increase the industry profits when compared to no 
unilateral actions, maybe by weakening the tax proposed. Second, the self regulation might 
pre-empt the tax and this could give the industry larger profits than if there had been no self 
regulation. With the PVA more self-regulation does not increase the social benefits, this is 
because then the program might provide unnecessary subsidies to firms that would have made 
the environmental improvement anyway. For example, the forest owners who already have 
made forest set-asides would get a subsidy for the voluntary actions they made before. This 
clearly would not be an incentive for self-regulation. In the eyes of the society, the increase of 
self-regulation could then be desirable under a tax proposal but not under a PVA proposal. 
For the forest industry this could mean that VFSs are only desirable if they are strong enough 
to pre-empt a tax (Lyon & Maxwell, 2002). 
 
The VA might not lead to environmental improvement. Instead the improvements made by 
the industry could have taken place without the VA, so called business-as-usual behaviour 
Forest  
set-asides 
FSs* VFSs* 
Σi MCi + TRCV  
Σi MCi   
MV   
SEK/ha Σi MCi + TRCM 
MFSs* 
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(Brink, 2002). This could mean that the VFSs made by the forest owners are the same forest 
set-asides that would have been there without green forest plans and certification systems. It 
can be the forest that would have been left anyway since it is not good enough or the owner 
wants to keep it for hunting. But still the forest owners would get credit for these as VFSs. 
Holmen, one of the larger forest companies in Sweden, for example, kept VFSs in the north 
with a lower biological value then the forest they had harvested (Nygren, 2005). 
 
2.3 How to make and evaluate a VA 
 
Previous in this chapter VFSs have been analysed from the view of firms, the government and 
the society. The last part of this chapter will examine how a good VA should be formulated 
and a summary of the chapter will also be made. 
 
There are some key features that can increase the efficiency of a VA. The first is the existence 
of a regulatory threat because it creates incentives for the firms to join the VA and it decreases 
the need for financial incentives like subsidies. For the regulator, a strong threat means a 
greater barging power and a possibility to negotiate a higher level of abatement. It is crucial 
though that the threat is credible. To be able to use the threat effectively a reliable monitoring 
of the VA should be in place. The monitoring should be able to say whether or not the targets 
have been met (Albertini & Segerson, 2002). 
 
The monitoring also prevent the industry from initiating a VA that is just a little bit better than 
business-as-usual just so they can pre-empt a more effective instrument. For this reason there 
should exist a comparable alternative along the VA (Brink, 2002). A recent investigation 
published by the government has evaluated the VFSs within the object of Sustainable Forests 
and it points out that the sub-goal of VFSs, in year 2010, has been hard to follow up (SOU 
2006:81). The main reason is that the government has agreed on an object that assumes 
voluntary actions from the forest owners and therefore lack the possibility to require 
information about the VFSs. There is little reliable material available with information about 
the value, duration and location of the VFSs. The investigations that the Forest Agency has 
made lead to criticism about the way the follow up of VFSs are carried out. The main 
objection is that the government should not have anything to do with what forest owners do 
on a voluntary basis. A reason why VFSs are difficult to evaluate is also because there is 
unwillingness among forest owners to inform where their VFSs are located (ibid).  
How effective the VAs are when it comes to the ability to reach the intended results like 
emission results or energy saving is difficult to say. This area has been inconclusively 
explored since there is not enough data to evaluate them. Often a clear baseline is missing 
because it might be difficult to get data on the situation before the voluntary initiative, the 
business-as-usual stage. There has been some proof that the information flow between the 
industry and government that a VA create have made both parts more aware of new more 
environmental friendly technology and more flexible to respond to the new knowledge. The 
difficulties with evaluating the VAs might make them less popular in the future. They need to 
have clear defined targets in order to work (Paton, 2002).  
 
To conclude this chapter a summary based on some key questions as formulated in Segerson 
and Albertini, 2002, will be answered. The VFSs can be defined as a unilateral agreement. 
Before 1996 the definition for VFSs did not exist and therefore a comparable baseline for the 
VFSs is difficult to estimate. For the VFSs there seem to be initiatives since VFSs are being 
done, these incentives can be certification, green plans and stewardship. So far, neither 
positive or negative government inducements have been used for the VFSs. There exists a 
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suggestion that a financial compensation should be given to the forest owners who make 
VFSs. In this investigation no strong threat of regulated VFSs has been found. The last 
evaluating question is if the cost of meeting the environmental target is lower under a VA 
than under the use of an alternative instrument? Do the individual firms have the flexibility to 
choose strategy and will the abatement be allocated across the polluters so that differences in 
abatement cost are used and the aggregated cost of meeting the target is reduced (Alertini & 
Segerson, 2002)? The cost of VFSs will be more closely evaluated in the following empirical 
chapter. 
 
 
3 Estimations based on FSC and the Forest 
Agency 
 
In this chapter empirical estimations of two supply curves, i.e. a marginal cost curves, for the 
VFSs made in Sweden will be presented. First a cost estimation of the VFSs based on data 
from FSC-Sweden will be done, concerning certificated forest in different counties of 
Sweden. Then the model estimated will be compared to the estimations that the Swedish 
Forest Agency has made concerning VFSs in different regions in Sweden. The results will 
also be evaluated with help from the theory presented in the previous chapter. 
 
3.1 Estimation of VFS supply curve  
 
The Swedish FSC has made estimations of the total area of FSC-certificated forest for each 
county in Sweden year 2004 and year 2006 (www, FSC1, 2006). In this thesis this data is used 
to estimate how the cost of VFSs influences the amount of ha VFSs in Sweden. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, VFSs are not only done through FSC-certification in Sweden. Since 
this is the only county based data presented, this will represent the VFSs made in Sweden. To 
be able to do this a strong assumption concerning VFSs within FSC is made. FSC-Sweden 
requires a minimum of 5 % of the forest to be set aside from production and here it is 
assumed that this is the case. It should be known that a lot of forest owners can set more forest 
aside. The common recommendation from certificate firms, counsellors and associations is 
about 5 % VFSs and large forest companies like Holmen Skog, have a goal of 5 % 
(Skogstyrelsen, October 2001, pers. com. Kårén, 2006). From the FSC-area for each county 5 
% is therefore estimated to be VFSs (see appendix 1). These results are presented in table 1 
where the county with the most hectares of VFSs is presented first. Within the parentheses are 
the areas of VFSs calculated as a share of total productive forest land for each county rounded 
off to one decimal (see appendix 2).  
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Table 1: Voluntary forest set-asides in ha, as five percent of total county FSC area 
(Source: own adaptation of www, FSC1, 2006) 
 
 
 
In table 1, it can be seen that the largest areas of VFSs are in the north of Sweden in the 
counties of Norbotten, Västerbotten and Jämtland. Compared to the total area of productive 
forest the counties with the highest share of VFSs are the counties in the north with 2.7 – 3.1 
% VFSs. Then the assessed value for productive forest for the year 2004 and 2005 is 
calculated since no assessed value for 2006 yet is published (Skogstyrelsen, 2006) (See 
appendix 3). The main cost for the forest owners should be the loss of profit, the opportunity 
cost when they set forest aside from production and which is here estimated as the assessed 
value for the forest land. There are other costs associated with VFSs like cost of searching for 
information and cost of certification. However is it hard to estimate which part of these costs 
that are related to the VFSs. Andreas Renöfält, SGS Sweden, who is one of the largest 
certification organisations, thinks that there should not be any great certification cost 
connected to the VFSs since the certification is a lot more and deals with the management of 
the forest, and the VFSs basically mean to put forest aside from production (Pers.com., 
Renöfält, 2006). Here the assessed value is an average value for the whole county and it 
should be known that the assessed value can vary a little within the county. The result is 
presented in table 2 and shows the county with the lowest assessed value/ha first.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
County 5% from FSC 2004 5% from FSC 2006
Norrbotten 115063  (3.1) 114897  (3.1)
Västerbotten 87864  (2.8) 86591  (2.7)
Jämtland 71657  (2.7) 72392  (2.7)
Västernorrland 43571  (2.5) 43594  (2.5)
Dalarna 42651  (2.2) 42551  (2.2)
Gävleborg 36792 (2.4) 36990  (2.4)
Värmland 23800  (1.8) 23916  (1.8)
Örebro 14645  (2.5) 15073  (2.6)
Uppsala 9298 (2.2) 9299  (2.2)
Västmanland 6628  (1.7) 6583  (1.7)
Västra Götaland 5869  (0.5) 6530  (0.5)
Östergötland 5456  (0.9) 5867  (0.9)
Kalmar 4870  (0.7) 4901  (0.7)
Skåne 4132  (1.1) 4744  (1.3)
Kronoberg 4113  (0.6) 4181  (0.7)
Stockholm 3750  (1.4) 3567  (1.4)
Jönköping 3544  (0.5) 3687  (0.5)
Södermanland 3039  (0.9) 3099  (0.9)
Blekinge 1148  (0.6) 1196  (0.7)
Halland 1117  (0.4) 1312  (0.4)
Gotland 370  (0.3) 374  (0.3)
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Table 2: Assessed value for productive forest land in SEK per ha for each county expressed in 
prices of 2005 (Source: own adaptation of www, skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the lowest costs of VFSs are also found in the counties of Norrbotten, 
Västerbotten and Jämtland. By using the data from 2004 and 2006 (the assessed value/ha 
from 2005 will represent 2006 here) a marginal cost curve for the VFSs made within FSC in 
Sweden can be estimated. In order to see which effect differences in cost have on the amount 
of VFSs being made, the ha of VFSs made under each assessed value/ha are accumulated 
starting with the lowest value. In other words, it is calculated how the differences in cost 
affect the amount of VFSs being made in Sweden, see table 3. 
 
Table 3: Accumulated ha of VFSs from FSC for each county and year 
(Source: own adaptation of www, FSC1, 2006, Skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
Year 2004 Year 2006
Assessed value Accumaleted VFSs Assessed value Accumaleted VFSs
2715 115063 4191 114897
5036 186720 5682 187289
5453 274584 6724 273880
6328 274954 8002 317474
7199 318525 8975 317848
9926 361176 10066 360399
10190 397968 11797 397389
12743 421768 14921 421305
15037 428396 19060 430604
15848 437694 19452 445677
16859 452339 20128 452260
17656 455378 21724 458790
17854 461247 22911 462357
19688 464997 23825 465456
19697 470453 24743 470357
21954 475323 27071 476224
23371 476440 28231 477536
25315 479984 29087 481223
25376 479984 29218 485404
28051 485245 31661 486600
29563 489377 36505 491344
County 2004 2005
Norrbotten 2715 4191
Jämtland 5036 5682
Västerbotten 5453 6724
Gotland 6328 8975
Västernorrland 7199 8002
Dalarna 9926 10066
Gävleborg 10190 11797
Värmland 12743 14921
Västmanland 15037 20128
Uppsala 15848 19060
Örebro 16859 19452
Södermanland 17656 23825
Västra Götaland 17854 21724
Stockholm 19688 22911
Östergötland 19697 27071
Kalmar 21954 24743
Halland 23371 28231
Jönköpings 25315 29087
Kronoberg 25376 29218
Blekinge 28051 31661
Skåne 29563 36505
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In table 3 it is possible to see the differences between the two years. Most counties show more 
set-asides even though the opportunity cost rises which can be seen as strange. One possible 
explanation could be that here it is assumed that 5 % is set aside. In reality, it could be more 
and when the cost increases the share of VFSs migh decrease to the minimum requirement of 
5 %. This effect is not taken into account. For 2006, what can be seen is that the assessed 
value/ha is in general higher than for 2004. In order to estimate a marginal cost curve for 
Sweden the ha of VFSs from both years are accumulated and this gives the following result, 
see figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Assessed value and accumulated ha of VFSs for 2004 and 2006 
(Source: own adaptation) 
 
The counties with a low assessed value/ha Norbotten, Västerbotten and Jämtland are 
represented in the lower part. The counties with a higher assessed value/ha Skåne, Blekinge 
and Kronoberg are represented up right.  
 
The marginal cost curve shows the additional cost from a change in ha of VFSs.  To estimate 
the marginal cost curve that fits the data presented best, a regression analysis is done in 
MINITAB. A quadratic equation is estimated, which is written as  
 
y=a+ d + bx + cx2+ ε    (3.1) 
 
where y is the cost/ha, x is the area of VFSs in ha, d is the dummy for year 2004 and  ε is the 
error term which is assumed to follow a N(0, σ2). Here, it is assumed that there is no other 
cost than the opportunity cost and the marginal cost function should therefore start in the 
origin. However, the regression analysis made in MINITAB includes an intercept. The first 
data from the FSC starts at about 114 000 ha and therefore the interesting interval should be 
from that point on, the intercept is therefore not further analysed. The regression analysis (see 
appendix 4) gives the following result:  
 
y= 17641 – 1961γ – 0.129x + 0.0000003x2   (3.2) 
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The T-value is 2.27 for γ, 4.87 for x and 7.75 for x2 and the R2 for the entire equation is 90.1 
%. The γ is the Dummy-Variable which represents the different years. In function 3.2 it is 
shown that for year 2004 the cost is in average 1961 SEK/ha lower than for the year 2006.  
 
γ{     (3.3) 
 
 
In figure 5 the regression line is drawn.  
 
 
Figure 5: Regression line 
(Source: own adaptation) 
 
This curve shows a decrease and a slow increase for the first 350 000 ha of VFSs and then the 
marginal cost of VFSs increase more rapidly. The reason are that larger areas are set aside in 
the north to a low marginal cost while smaller areas is set aside in the south to a higher 
marginal cost.  
 
In the example above the total amount of VFSs in Sweden is 491 344 ha for 2006. The Forest 
Agency has estimated that there was 993 000 ha of VFSs made in Sweden 2002 (www, 
Skogstyrelsen1, 2007). From this about 800 000 – 850 000 ha is estimated to be below the 
mountain border (www, miljömål2, 2006). Therefore each county should have the potential to 
set more forest aside under each assessed value/ha. The estimations made by the Forest 
Agency only show the VFSs for five different regions in Sweden and all counties except for 
the county of Gotland is included in these regions. The regions are illustrated in figure 6 on 
the following page. 
= 1 if value from year 2004 
= 0 if value from year 2006 
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Figure 6: Regions for VFSs estimation in Sweden 
(Source: Skogstyrelsen, p 99, 2006) 
 
The results from the five regions can then be applied to the results from FSC-Sweden. Since 
the estimations made by the Forest Agency do not show which forest that is below the 
mountain border, all ha of VFSs made are included here. The Forest Agency estimates that 
region 1 and 2 together set 456 000 ha of forest aside, see table 4, compared to the estimated 
201 488 ha of VFSs 2006 for the same region, see Norboten and Västerbotten in table 1. This 
would mean that the counties of Norrbotten and Västerbotten have the potential to set 126% 
more forest aside then estimated previously. In table 4, the ha of VFSs made in each region 
are compared to the results for the counties of that region (table 1) and the potential increase 
in ha is estimated for each region. 
 
Table 4: Ha of VFSs in different regions and the potential increase in per cent 
(Source: own adaptation of www, FSC1, 2006, Skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
To estimate a marginal cost curve based on the results from the Forest Agency the data from 
the FSC for each county is adjusted with the potential of its' region for all counties but 
Gotland, see table 5.  
Year  Forest Agency 2002 FSC 2004 Potential in % FSC 2006 Potential in %
Region 1+2 456 000 202927 125 201488 124
Region 3 292 000 218471 34 219433 33
Region 4 149 000 61212 143 62787 137
Region 5 96 000 6397 1400 7252 1224
Tot 993 000 489007 103 490960 102
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Table 5: Adjustment of ha of VFSs for each county after Forest Agency 
(Source: own adaptation of www, FSC1, 2006, Skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
The results from table 5 can then be used to estimate a new marginal cost curve. As with the 
previously estimated curve, the ha of VFSs made under each assessed value/ha (see table 2) 
are accumulated starting with the lowest value. In table 6 the results are presented. 
 
Table 6: Accumulated ha of VFSs for each county and year after the Forest Agency 
(Source: own adaptation of www, FSC1, 2006, Skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
Year 2004 Year 2006
Assessed value/ha Accumulated VFSs Assessed value/ha Accumulated VFSs
2715 258891 4191 259667
5036 354911 6724 455363
5453 552605 5682 551644
6328 552975 8002 609624
7199 611360 11797 658821
9926 668512 10066 715414
10190 717813 14921 747222
12743 749705 19452 782945
15037 765811 20128 798547
15848 788405 19060 820586
16859 823992 22911 829040
17656 831377 23825 829040
17854 845639 27071 850290
19688 854751 21724 865766
19697 868009 29087 874504
21954 879843 29218 884413
23371 896598 24743 896028
25315 905210 8975 896402
25376 915205 28231 913773
28051 932425 31661 929608
29563 994405 36505 992419
County Ha of VFSs 2004 Ha of VFSs 2006
Region 1+2 Norrbotten 258891 259667
Västerbotten 197694 195696
Region 3 Jämtland 96020 96281
Västernorrland 58385 57980
Gävleborg 49301 49197
Dalarna 57152 56593
Värmland 31892 31808
Region 4 Örebro 35587 35723
Västmanland 16106 15602
Uppsala 22594 22039
Stockholm 9112 8454
Södermanland 7385 7345
Östergötland 13258 13905
Västra Götaland 14262 15476
Jönköping 8612 8738
Kronoberg 9995 9909
Kalmar 11834 11615
Gotland 370 374
Region 5 Halland 16755 17371
Blekinge 17220 15835
Skåne 61980 62811
Tot. 994405 992419
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The ha of VFSs for both years are accumulated and a regression analysis is made in 
MINITAB ( see Appendix 5) with the following result: 
 
y= 15636 – 1235γ – 0.0607x + 0.00000008x2   (3.4) 
 
The T-value is 3.13 for γ, 9.43 for x and 16.35 for x2 and the R2 for the entire equation is 97.9 
%.  In figure 7 this regression is illustrated. 
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Figure 7: Regression line for VFSs after Forest Agency 
(Source: own adaptation) 
 
As before the counties of the north are represented in the lower part and in the highest part the 
counties of the south are represented.  
This curve shows a slow increase of the marginal cost for the first 600 000 ha of forest that is 
set aside. This comes from the fact that large areas of forest are set aside in the north of 
Sweden to a low cost. After the first 600 000 ha VFSs, the marginal cost increase more 
rapidly, since the counties with a higher marginal cost set less forest aside. To use the results 
from the Forest Agency is difficult since they show that in total 993 000 ha is set aside. This 
represents 800 000 – 850 000 below the mountain border and these are the set-asides that 
should be 730 000 ha according to the goal from Sustainable Forests (www, miljömål2, 
2006). There is also the problem that a great part is based on questionnaires and it is likely 
that the set-asides in region 5 do not all represent productive forest (Pers.com. Ståhl1, 2, 2006). 
 
3.2 Subsidy policy for VFSs 
 
Since the concept of VFSs was introduced 1996, the amount of ha VFSs has increased. The 
environmental object, Sustainable Forests, was introduced 1998 and latest published results 
state that sub-goal for 2010 is reached. During 2005 the Forest Agency has investigated all 
VFSs in Sweden and the results indicate that the small forest owners put less forest aside than 
suggested in earlier estimations and that the overall area of VFSs has decreased. It is now 
likely that more VFSs have to be done to reach the goal of 2010 (www, miljömål2, 2006). 
Table 7 reports set-aside areas for different regions and for different years, where the share of 
the total forest that the VFSs represent is within parentheses. 
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Table 7: Voluntary forest set-asides in ha and region for all owners in Sweden 
(Source: own adaptation after www, Skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
'If the goal of Sustainable forests is not reached the government might have to introduce a 
subsidy to increase the VFSs. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a  governmental 
investigation, SOU 2006:81, suggests that a financial compensation could be given to the 
forest owners who join a more formal agreement. In order to derive the necessary subsidy per 
ha for achieving the target of 730 000 ha the functions 3.2  and 3.4 can be used. To reach the 
goal of Sustainable Forests, x is set equal to the goal of 730 000 ha VFSs and then equation 
3.2 and 3.4 are solved for y which represent the subsidy (γ = 0). The result is that a subsidy of 
83 341 SEK/ha is required to reach 730 000 ha of VFSs when equation 3.2 is used . When 
equation 3.4 is used a subsidy of 13 957 SEK/ha is needed to reach the goal of 730 000 ha 
VFSs. In figure 8 the different supply curves 3.2 and 3.4 are illustrated and the different 
subsidies are represented as horisontal lines. 
 
 
Figure 8: Different supply curves and different subsidies for VFSs 
(Source: Own adaptation) 
 
In figure 8 the differences between the two supply curves are evident. This implies that if a 
subsidy was to be introduced the true effect from it can be hard to estimate. More 
investigations that estimate the amount of VFSs in Sweden is needed in order to evaluate the 
response of a subsidy for VFSs. Here the supply curves are based on assumptions and do not 
provide an accurate picture. The VFSs made within FSC should be seen as the minimum 
amount of VFSs that are made in Sweden. The VFSs that are included in the estimations from 
the Forest Agency is not all below the mountain border and can therefore be seen as a 
maximum. The true supply curve of VFSs can therefore be anywhere between the curves 
estimated here.  
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Year 1996 2000 2002
Region 1+2 81000 377000   (5.4) 456000   (6.5)
Region 3 134000 198000   (2.3) 292000   (3.4)
Region 4 88000 132000   (2.2) 149000   (2.5)
Region 5 12000 95000  (11.7) 96000  (11.8)
Tot  (1.5) 328000 802000   (3.6) 993000   (4.4)
  19 
 
 
 
3.3 VFSs made by different forest owners 
 
In this part reports from the Forest Agency concerning VFSs are presented. The reports that 
have estimated the area of VFSs made by different forest owners in Sweden are from 1996, 
2000 and 2002. The estimations are divided in three owner groups, large forest owners (which 
include Sveaskog, Statens fastighetsverk, Bergvik skog, Holmen Skog and SCA), mid-size 
forest owners with more then 5 000 ha productive forest land who are not included in the 
large forest owners, and small forest owners with less then 5 000 ha productive forest land 
(Skogsstyrelsen1, 2007). These results are interesting since they show some differences 
between the owner types. First, the larger forest owners' development of VFSs is presented in 
table 8.  
 
Table 8: Voluntary forest set-asides in ha and region for large forest owners 
(Source: own adaptation of www, Skogsstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
For the large forest owners estimations have been done for three years. Like for all forest 
owners, table 7, the total ha of VFSs has increased since 1996. It is only in region 5 that the 
amount of VFSs have been unchanged 2000 and 2002. The difference from table 7 is that the 
share of VFSs is much lower in region 5 and higher in region 1+2, 3 and 4. The next category 
is the mid-size forest owners, see table 9.  
 
Table 9: Voluntary forest set-asides in ha and region for mid-size forest owners 
(Source: own adaptation of www, Skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
Here estimations have only been done for two years and they are based on questionnaires 
(Pers.com. Stål1, 2006). The main differences when compared with the results for all owners, 
table 7, are region 5 and region 4, but still the mid-size owners have a more even distribution 
of VFSs seen as a share of the total mid-size owned forest. The last category is the small 
forest owners, see table 10. These estimations from the Forest Agency are also based on 
questionnaires (Pers.com. Stål1, 2006). 
Year 1996 2000 2002
Region 1+2 54000 279000   (7.3) 358000  (9.3)
Region 3 60000 104000   (2.6) 198000  (4.9)
Region 4 15000 33000   (3.6) 50000  (5.4)
Region 5 0 1000   (2.8) 1000  (2.8)
Tot (1.5) 130000 417000   (4.7) 608000  (6.9)
Year 1996 2000
Region 1+2 19000 32000  (7.8)
Region 3 14000 20000  (4.4)
Region 4 21000 36000  (7.7)
Region 5 2000 3000  (5.1)
Tot (3.5) 60000 91000  (5.1)
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Table 10: Voluntary forest set-asides in ha and region for small forest owners 
(Source: own adaptation of www, Skogsstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
For the small forest owners the main difference from the large and mid-size owners, table 8 
and 9, is region 5 where they set 12.7 % aside from production. The main difference from the 
results for all owners, table 7, are region 1 and 2 where a much smaller share is set aside. The 
same is seen for region 3 and 4 but the differences are smaller. The small forest owners are 
the ones who set the least forest aside, 2.4 % compared to 5.1 % for the mid-size owners and 
6.9 % for the large forest owners.  
To get an overview of the opportunity cost in different regions from the VFSs, a comparison 
with the assessed value in average per ha has been made. By using the assessed value for 
productive forest land, in each county and for the different years, and dividing it with the area 
of productive forest land an assessed value/ha for each region is calculated (see appendix 6). 
The assessed value here becomes an average value and it should be known that it can vary a 
lot within the region. The estimated average assessed value for the different regions can be 
seen in table 11. 
 
Table 11: Assessed value in average for each region, SEK/ ha represented in prices of 2002 
(Source: own adaptation of www, Skogstyrelsen1, 2007) 
 
 
This would mean that the greatest cost of VFSs is in region 5 and the lowest cost is in region 
1+2. The results from region 5 are puzzling since the highest share of VFSs is done where the 
cost from VFSs is the highest. Considering table 8 and 9, large and mid-size owners, the 
highest share of VFSs are made in region 1 and 2. The small forest owners are the ones who 
set the most forest aside in region 5 to a high cost, this could mean that their benefits from the 
VFSs are high. Per-Olof Ståhl at the Forest Agency see a possible explanation in the fact that 
in the south of Sweden there are more pasture land with trees. These areas do not hold that 
much wood but are still classified as forest land and have little economical effect for the forest 
owner. In the model all land is seen as productive forest land. He also suggests another 
possible explanation that would be hard to prove, the forest owners in the south might be 
better at setting forest aside (Pers. com. Ståhl2, 2006).  
 
To conclude the results from the Forest Agency the small forest owners are the ones who set 
the least forest aside. From what was presented in the previous chapter one could argue that 
they do not feel a need for signalling like big forest companies might do. This may suggest 
that big forest owners fear the government may implement a regulation if they fail making 
enough VFSs. The media image is more important for the big forest owners and therefore 
they want to signal themselves as “good”. The small forest owners do not individually have a 
lot of media attention and do not care as much about doing what is “good”. 
Year 1996 2000
Region 1+2 17000 66000  (2.4)
Region 3 60000 74000  (1.8)
Region 4 51000 63000  (1.4)
Region 5 10000 91000  12.7)
Tot (1.2) 138000 294000  (2.4)
Year 1996 2000 2002
Region 1+2 3405 3838 3787
Region 3 7352 8470 8462
Region 4 14662 17406 18221
Region 5 19578 24044 25324
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There can also be a difference in the willingness to certificate the forest. Small forest owners 
do not harvest as often as big forest companies. Therefore they might not care if they get a 
little more for a “greener” product when they consider what they have to change in their forest 
management. The forest owner associations however, are all promoting certification. The 
large forest companies are all certificated with FSC and some also with PECF (www, Bergvik 
Skog, Holmen Skog, Sveaskog, Svenska cellulosa aktiebolaget, Statens fastighetsverk, 2006). 
For them it should be easier to implement the forest management needed and the fact, as 
mentioned before, that other companies like IKEA only buy certificated wood should also 
affect their behaviour. The small forest owners might also want a financial compensation for 
making VFSs and according to Maxwell and Lyon (2003) a suspicion that the government 
will introduce a voluntary public agreement, VPA, will have the affect that no VFSs will be 
made before the VPA. The benefits from VFSs can be higher for large forest companies: 
improving public relations, power to influence future regulations, and possibility to sell 
“green” products. The small forest owners might not hold these benefits as high.  
 
In Jansson (2005), 21 small forest owners in Uppland were asked about their knowledge of 
VFSs. Three of the owners who had VFSs were not aware of it since they had someone who 
planned their forest. This shows the power the person who plan the forest has. Most of the 
owners actually pointed to the forest plans as the grounds for having VFSs. There were also 
owners who did not trust the Forest Agency. Three forest owners had VFSs that were not 
documented within any plan and they also had the view that the Forest Agency should not 
interfere with how they managed their forest (ibid). This could have an effect on the results 
from the Forest Agency if the persons asked have no knowledge of VFSs or if they do not 
want the Forest Agency to know what they do. 
 
From the estimated marginal cost curves the conclusion that could be drawn is that small 
forest owners might have a higher marginal cost for their forest. The large forest owners set 
large areas in the north aside with a low marginal cost, first interval of the curves, the small 
forest owners do not have the possibility to choose where in Sweden to make their VFSs and 
they might be situated where the marginal cost of VFSs is high. One of the benefits with VAs 
is that they are flexible and cost minimizing; it is possible to choose how to make the 
environmental improvement. These benefits might be harder to obtain for a small forest 
owner.  
The empirical results from the Forest Agency do not investigate the quality of the VFSs, if it 
is forest with a high biological value that is being set aside. In May/ June 2007, a new report 
will be published that will show VFSs in counties of Sweden and the quality of these VFSs 
(Pers.com. Ståhl1, 2006). 
 
4 Summary and Discussion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyse the potential of VFSs from a theoretical perspective, 
and to estimate a supply curve, i.e. a marginal cost curve, for VFSs in Sweden. The results 
were then compared with the results from the Forest Agency concerning VFSs. How are the 
VFSs working with respect to flexibility and cost minimization and where in Sweden it is 
likely that VFSs can be made? What can be said about the incentives for VFSs and is there a 
difference between the amount of forest set aside by different owners? 
 
When talking about the benefits from VAs it is clear that it is the cost minimization and the 
flexibility that make them attractive. The VFSs represent this feature as they can be seen as 
voluntary and the forest owners are free to choose which forest to set aside. But the empirical 
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result from the Forest Agency shows that it is mainly the larger forest companies who can use 
the flexibility and the cost minimizing benefits from the VFSs. They have larger areas of 
forest and can choose to set forest aside to low marginal cost. The small forest owners are 
more bound, if they want to set forest aside they might have to do this to a high marginal cost. 
For the forest owner the benefits and cost from VFSs can vary.  
 
In this thesis only the opportunity cost has been estimated though there might be other costs 
associated with the VFSs. For the forest owner to make any VFSs the marginal benefits have 
to be higher than or just as high as the marginal cost. As presented in the empirical part the 
marginal cost varies in Sweden. For forest to be set aside in Skåne, in the south, the benefits 
need to be higher than in the north of Sweden. This might be true, but it is also clear that less 
forest is set aside in the south. Since the larger forest owners set more forest aside it can be 
that they have higher marginal benefits than the small forest owners. This can come from the 
fact that they might have a stronger possibility to influence the authorities or benefit more 
from an environmental friendly image.  
 
The VFSs can be seen as a form of self regulation and the strongest reason for this would be a 
potential threat. However, little evidence of a strong threat of legislation has been found in 
this thesis. There is some evidence that the authorities are not happy with the VFSs mostly 
since they are hard to monitor and nothing is said about the duration of the VFSs. The free 
rider incentive that is associated with VAs when some firms benefit from the environmental 
improvements made by others might apply here. The smaller forest owners can have 
advantages from the self regulation made by the large forest companies. For the society the 
benefit from a VA is that it reduces the cost and potential transaction cost associated with a 
more formal alternative. No arguments that the transaction cost associated with VFSs should 
have a great impact have been found. The monitoring is done by the Forest Agency and since 
there is no alternative to compare it with, here this argument cannot be used to say that the 
VFSs have a lower cost than legislation. From the literature concerning VA, the conclusion 
can be drawn that in general legislative regulations should have a higher transaction cost than 
the VAs. The investigation made by the government suggests that a VPA should be 
introduced, an agreement between the government and the forest owner about the VFSs, 
which can lead to financial compensation to the owner. The forest owners have little reason to 
self regulate when a VPA is suggested unless they can pre-empt a future legislation through 
the VPA. In this case the VPA was suggested in October 2006, and should not have had any 
affect. However in the future less VFSs might be done if there is not a real legislative threat 
behind a suggested VPA for the VFSs.  
 
In this thesis the estimated supply curves for VFSs in Sweden is based on some assumptions 
and therefore represents a minimum and a maximum curve. Both curves have a slow increase 
in the beginning which comes from the fact that large areas can be set aside in the North of 
Sweden to a low cost. When these supply curves are used to estimate the subsidy needed to 
reach the goal of 730 000 ha VFSs, the results differ a lot. For the supply curve based on the 
minimum requirement from the FSC a subsidy of 83 341 SEK/ha is required. When using the 
supply curve which has been changed after the potential for each region according to the 
Forest Agency, the subsidy required is 13 957 SEK/ha. This implies the importance of 
investigations concerning the amount of VFSs being made. The true supply curve should be 
somewhere between the curves estimated here.  
 
There is a difference between the amount of VFSs being made by different forest owners. The 
large and the mid sized forest owners set the most forest aside. They also have the highest 
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share of VFSs made in the north to a low opportunity cost. The results from region 5 with the 
highest opportunity cost are suprising though. Here, the large forest owners and the mid-size 
owners have their smallest share of VFSs. The results for the small forest owners differ a lot. 
It seems unlikely that they should set such a large share aside from production. One reason for 
this might be that pasture land with trees is included here as productive forest. Another reason 
can be that the estimations made by the Forest Agency are wrong. The results published in the 
beginning of year 2006 indicated that the small forest owners set much less forest aside then 
previously estimated and that the goal of 730 000 ha VFSs might not be reached until 2010.  
The conclusions that can be drawn are that by estimating supply curves for VFSs made in 
Sweden estimations concerning subsidies and marginal costs can be made. The results 
however have a lot of uncertainty and more accurate data should be used to give a proper 
picture. What can be concluded is that the marginal cost varies depending on where the VFSs 
are located in Sweden. There is also a difference between the amount of VFSs made by large 
forest owners and small forest owners.  
 
For a VA to be a functional policy instrument it should lead to environmental improvement in 
a cost minimizing way. The environmental improvements are something that can not be 
evaluated in this thesis. There are no investigations made for the entire Sweden that state 
which kind of forest that is set aside. Even though today, when using published results, there 
are about 800 000 ha of VFSs below the mountain border, and still nothing is said about the 
biological value of these VFSs.  
 
It is easier for the VA to work if there is a credible threat of regulation from the government. 
No strong threats have been found during this thesis and this could be an explanation why it 
seems unlikely that the goal for 2010 will be reached. Another requirement is the cost 
effectiveness, and this is something that the VFSs should represent for the larger forest 
owners. The smaller forest owners might not see the VFSs as cost effective, if they must set 5 
% aside to a high marginal cost as a certification requirement or through a forest plan. There 
is flexibility, the forest owner choose himself which forest to set aside. However, if the forest 
owners see 5 % as the standard and just follow the requirements it would be more like a set 
target. 
The marginal cost curve estimated based on the minimum requirement of FSC rises fast when 
a larger amount of forest is set aside. If there is not enough net benefit from the VFSs the goal 
for Sweden of 730 000 ha might lead to a net loss. The estimated subsidy needed to meet the 
target for Sustainable Forests becomes quite high when compared to the assessed value from 
the counties, 83 341 SEK/ha. When using the curve adapted after the results from the Forest 
Agency 13 957 SEK/ha would be the subsidy to reach 730 000 ha VFSs. The largest benefits 
from a subsidy should be in the north where the opportunity costs are low. In resent results the 
Forest Agency estimates that less forest than believed is set aside from small forest owners. It 
would be possible to give financial support to them in order to create incentives for VFSs.  
Suggestion for future studies would be a more exact cost analysis of the VFSs, when new 
results from the Forest Agency are published. With these new results the quality and the 
assessed value of the VFSs along with the exact data from counties or communities can 
provide more exact estimations. It would also be useful to estimate the benefits from VFSs. 
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6. Appendix 
 
 Appendix 1 
 
Total area of FSC in each county (www,FSC1, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
Länsvis areal 2006
Län 2006 2004Förändring Ha Förändring %
Blekinge 23922 22964 958 4%
Dalarna 851023 853010 -1987 0%
Gotland 7481 7409 72 1%
Gävleborg 739800 735836 3964 1%
Halland 26230 22336 3894 17%
Jämtland 1447830 1433146 14684 1%
Jönköping 73735 70881 2854 4%
Kalmar 98015 97408 607 1%
Kronoberg 83619 82268 1351 2%
Norrbotten 2297936 2301272 -3336 0%
Skåne 94875 82641 12234 15%
Stockholm 71333 75006 -3673 -5%
Södermanland 61977 60776 1201 2%
Uppsala 185981 185960 21 0%
Värmland 478327 475996 2331 0%
Västerbotten 1731820 1757275 -25455 -1%
Västernorrland 871874 871411 463 0%
Västmanland 131660 132552 -892 -1%
Västra Götaland 130603 117374 13229 11%
Örebro 301464 292907 8557 3%
Östergötland 117347 109129 8218 8%
Summa 9826852 9787557 39295 0,40%
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 Appendix 2 
 
Total area of productive forest for each county 
 
 
 
 
Areal skogsmark och impediment¹ med fördelning på län och ägarkategorier under perioden 1999-2003
Area of forest and unproductive land by county and ownership categories during 1999-2003
Län och landsdel²
County/region²
Skogsmark Impediment Skogsmark Impediment Skogsmark Impediment Skogsmark Impediment
Forest land Non-productive landForest land Non-productive landForest land Non-productive landForest land Non-productive land
Norrbottens 510 308 1.905 646 1.200 628 3.615 1.582
Västerbottens 300 122 1.487 499 1.416 419 3.203 1.040
Jämtlands 139 108 1.395 417 1.125 411 2.659 936
Västernorrlands 55 8 940 156 733 129 1.728 293
Gävleborgs 115 11 729 91 655 98 1.499 200
Dalarnas 210 96 835 180 862 169 1.907 445
Värmlands 88 10 488 85 758 104 1.334 199
Örebro 57 3 264 35 257 27 578 65
Västmanlands 54 7 133 16 191 12 378 35
Uppsala 65 5 164 12 170 29 399 46
Stockholms 55 21 31 6 160 45 246 72
Södermanlands 53 5 68 7 218 33 339 45
Östergötlands 84 12 170 23 354 50 608 85
Västra Götalands 154 27 134 18 1.012 224 1.300 269
Jönköpings 45 3 93 10 593 43 731 56
Kronobergs 46 3 78 7 538 44 662 54
Kalmar 39 9 169 20 536 67 744 96
Gotlands 12 6 6 5 104 27 122 38
Hallands 35 5 10 2 253 37 298 44
Blekinge 14 4 12 0 157 10 183 14
Skåne 48 4 27 4 278 26 353 34
N Norrland 810 430 3.392 1.145 2.616 1.047 6.818 2.622
S Norrland 309 127 3.064 664 2.513 638 5.886 1.429
Svealand 582 147 1.983 341 2.616 419 5.181 907
Götaland 477 73 699 89 3.825 528 5.001 690
2.178 777 9.138 2.239 11.570 2.632 22.886 5.648
climate conditions, rock surface and subalpine coniferous woodland.
Ägarkategori  Ownership  category Samtliga  All categories
Allmänna Public forest Aktiebolag  Forest companyPrivata Private
Areal, 1 000 hektar  Area, 1.000 hectares
Hela landet Entire country
1.  Med impediment avses ägoslagen myr inkl. annat klimatimpediment, berg och fjällbarrskog.
1. Non-productive refers to following land-use classes: swamp, other waste land because of 
2.  Beträffande områdesindelningen, se bilaga 7, figur 2. 2. Boundaries of counties and regions shown in Appendix 7, Figure 2.
Källa: Riksskogstaxeringen. Source: Swedish National Forest Inventory.
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Areal skogsmark och impediment¹ med fördelning på län och ägarkategorier under perioden 1994-1998
Area of forest and unproductive land by county and ow nership categories during the period 1994-1998
Ow nership category²
1 000 hektar  
Nbtn 494 285 1.880 683 1.253 623 3.626 1.591
Vbtn 216 77 1.597 490 1.288 437 3.100 1.005
Jmtl 171 135 1.222 462 1.118 446 2.512 1.044
Vnrl 93 19 820 145 731 139 1.644 303
Gävl 87 15 695 86 713 63 1.495 164
Dlrn 353 114 728 162 861 171 1.942 446
Vrml 63 6 459 83 797 121 1.319 210
Öreb 62 6 315 40 220 17 597 65
Vstm 48 5 155 35 195 22 398 62
Upps 54 7 170 21 170 21 394 50
Sthm 72 22 66 14 175 47 313 83
Södm 58 9 51 12 232 45 342 66
Östg 73 12 159 26 364 60 596 97
Vgöt 129 25 128 26 1.035 209 1.291 260
Skbg 44 0 62 9 315 18 422 27
Älvs 57 10 52 9 578 88 687 107
Gtbg 27 16 13 7 141 102 181 125
Jkpg 45 8 96 9 573 46 715 62
Kron 61 5 78 8 500 41 639 54
Kalm 37 6 117 15 548 109 702 129
Gotl 16 6 3 5 103 34 122 45
Hall 16 4 24 4 247 40 288 47
Blek 11 2 11 0 175 12 197 14
Skåne 35 2 38 5 310 13 382 20
N Norrl 710 362 3.477 1.173 2.541 1.061 6.727 2.596
S Norrl 350 169 2.737 694 2.562 649 5.651 1.512
Sveal 710 171 1.945 367 2.650 445 5.304 982
Götal 423 68 654 99 3.854 561 4.931 729
2.192 771 8.813 2.333 11.608 2.715 22.613 5.818
1.  Med impediment avses ägoslagen myr inkl. annat klimatimpediment, berg och f jällbarrskog.
1 Waste land or other non-productiv land, Potential yield under ideal management conditions not more than 1 m³ per ha and year
By unproductive land means follow ing land-use classes: sw amp, other land unproductive because 
of climate conditions, rock surface and subalpine coniferous w oodland. 
Källa: Riksskogstaxeringen
Source: The National Forest Inventory.
Län och Ägarkategori²  Samtliga All
landsdel Allmänna Public forest Aktiebolag 
Company forest
Privata Private forest
County and part  of country
Skogsmark
Forest land
Impediment
Waste land
Skogsmark
Forest land
Impediment
Waste land
Skogsmark
Forest land
Impediment
Waste land
Skogsmark
Forest land
Impediment
Waste land
Hela landet
The w hole 
country
2 Definition på ägarkategorier
2 Ow nership categories
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 Appendix 3 
 
Assessed value for productive forest for each county 
 
 
Assessed value for each county expressed in assessed value/ha 
 
Tabell 14.8 Taxeringsvärden för produktiv skogsmark
Real estate tax assessment for forest land
1981 1992 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Norrbottens 2.428 5.879 7.691 8.489 8.919 9.889 9.538 9.921 9.887 15.321
Västerbottens 3.134 11.900 13.300 14.573 15.482 16.680 15.762 16.375 17.245 21.350
Jämtlands 2.619 9.244 10.371 11.456 12.331 13.043 12.387 12.851 13.498 15.290
Västernorrlands 2.949 8.576 9.692 10.480 11.283 12.033 11.380 11.815 12.432 13.876
Gävleborgs 3.150 9.964 11.723 12.883 13.865 14.751 13.989 14.551 15.335 17.825
Dalarnas 4.142 11.584 14.495 15.978 17.214 18.277 19.043 18.624 18.952 19.296
Värmlands 4.767 9.992 12.246 13.509 14.547 15.460 16.101 15.732 17.096 20.099
Örebro 2.379 6.202 7.228 7.994 8.610 9.146 9.259 9.045 9.840 11.399
Västmanlands 1.252 3.222 4.096 4.524 4.864 5.167 5.394 5.275 5.736 7.709
Stockholms 811 2.859 3.592 4.005 4.319 4.595 4.817 4.683 5.079 5.934
Uppsala 1.423 4.317 4.678 5.166 5.559 5.897 6.157 6.022 6.535 7.891
Södermanlands 1.402 3.635 4.227 4.667 5.016 5.341 5.554 5.441 5.944 8.053
Östergötlands 2.708 7.290 8.653 9.552 10.281 10.977 11.438 11.195 12.203 16.838
Västra Götalands 5.337 12.866 16.055 17.737 19.099 20.321 21.186 20.778 22.566 27.568
Jönköpings 4.143 8.554 13.235 14.586 15.681 16.646 17.375 16.979 18.457 21.292
Kronobergs 3.746 8.563 11.590 12.770 13.765 14.634 15.255 14.913 16.201 18.729
Kalmar 3.783 8.866 11.481 12.673 13.649 14.504 15.138 14.858 16.225 18.359
Gotlands 205 469 537 592 636 678 705 689 750 1.068
Hallands 1.298 4.254 4.906 5.401 5.810 6.191 6.514 6.355 6.867 8.328
Blekinge 1.048 2.414 3.605 3.964 4.268 4.535 4.725 4.618 5.029 5.699
Skåne 2.065 5.855 7.629 8.444 9.073 9.624 10.061 9.859 10.718 13.288
54.787 146.505 181.029 199.445 214.270 228.387 231.775 230.579 246.595 295.216
Källa: SCB.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
Län County
miljoner SEK Million SEK
Hela landet Entiry country
Län Tax/ha 1996 Tax/ha 2000 Tax/ha 2002 Tax/ha 2004 Tax/ha 2005
BD Norrbottens 2121 2483 2609 2704 4191
AC Västerbottens 4290 4869 4964 5431 6724
Z Jämtlands 4129 4657 4603 5016 5682
Y Västernorrlands 5895 6696 6563 7170 8002
X Gävleborgs 7841 9380 9258 10149 11797
W Dalarnas 7464 8896 9935 9886 10066
S Värmlands 9284 10938 11953 12692 14921
T Örebro 12107 14974 15800 16792 19452
U Västmanlands 10291 12568 13491 14977 20128
C Uppsala 11873 14290 14872 15785 19060
AB Stockholms 11476 16548 18598 19610 22911
D Södermanlands 12360 14840 16432 17586 23825
E Östergötlands 14518 17425 18389 19619 27071
O Västra Götalands 12436 14579 16695 17783 21724
F Jönköpings 18510 22306 23736 25214 29087
G Kronobergs 18138 20919 23799 25275 29218
H Kalmar 16355 18272 20402 21867 24743
I Gotlands 4402 5924 6303 8975
N Hallands 17035 19695 22081 23278 28231
K Blekinge 18299 22946 26250 27939 31661
M Skåne 19971 26452 27640 29445 36505
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 Appendix 4 
  
Regression Analysis: y versus x1; x1^2; dummy  
 
The regression equation is 
y = 17641 - 0,129 x1 + 0,000000 x1^2 - 1961 dummy 
 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef      T      P 
Constant        17641        4163   4,24  0,000 
x1           -0,12904     0,02649  -4,87  0,000 
x1^2       0,00000030  0,00000004   7,75  0,000 
dummy         -1960,9       864,8  -2,27  0,029 
 
 
S = 2793,58   R-Sq = 90,8%   R-Sq(adj) = 90,1% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF          SS         MS       F      P 
Regression       3  2922577763  974192588  124,83  0,000 
Residual Error  38   296555440    7804091 
Total           41  3219133203 
 
 
Source  DF      Seq SS 
x1       1  2401829460 
x1^2     1   480626373 
dummy    1    40121930 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs      x1      y    Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1  115063   2715   4852    1858     -2137     -1,02 X 
  2  114897   4191   6822    1875     -2631     -1,27 X 
 42  491344  36505  27519     770      8986      3,35R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Regression Analysis: y2 versus x; x^2; dummy  
 
The regression equation is 
y2 = 15636 - 0,0607 x + 0,000000 x^2 - 1235 dummy 
 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef      T      P 
Constant        15636        2050   7,63  0,000 
x           -0,060657    0,006435  -9,43  0,000 
x^2        0,00000008  0,00000000  16,35  0,000 
dummy         -1235,2       395,0  -3,13  0,003 
 
 
S = 1270,42   R-Sq = 98,1%   R-Sq(adj) = 97,9% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF          SS          MS       F      P 
Regression       3  3157802759  1052600920  652,19  0,000 
Residual Error  38    61330444     1613959 
Total           41  3219133203 
 
 
Source  DF      Seq SS 
x        1  2696289757 
x^2      1   445727337 
dummy    1    15785665 
 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs       x     y2    Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1  258891   2715   3987     815     -1272     -1,31 X 
  2  259667   4191   5207     819     -1016     -1,05 X 
 40  992973  29563  31996     508     -2433     -2,09R 
 42  992419  36505  33178     469      3327      2,82R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Assessed value for productive forest for each county and region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uttryckt i 2002 års priser
Län Tax/ha 1996 Tax/ha 2000 Tax/ha 2002
BD Norrbottens 2121 2483 2609Region 1+2
AC Västerbottens 4290 4869 4964
Z Jämtlands 4129 4657 4603
Y Västernorrlands 5895 6696 6563Region 3
X Gävleborgs 7841 9380 9258
W Dalarnas 7464 8896 9935
S Värmlands 9284 10938 11953
T Örebro 12107 14974 15800
U Västmanlands 10291 12568 13491
C Uppsala 11873 14290 14872
AB Stockholms 11476 16548 18598Region 4
D Södermanlands 12360 14840 16432
E Östergötlands 14518 17425 18389
O Västra Götalands 12436 14579 16695
F Jönköpings 18510 22306 23736
G Kronobergs 18138 20919 23799
H Kalmar 16355 18272 20402
I Gotlands 4402 5924
N Hallands 17035 19695 22081
K Blekinge 18299 22946 26250Region 5
M Skåne 19971 26452 27640
2000:4,4%
1996: 6,2%
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